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ABSTRACT
The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission is responsible for the safe operation
of the United States nuclear power plant fleet, and human reliability analysis forms an
important portion of the probabilistic risk assessment that demonstrates the safety of
sites. Treatment of post-initiating event human error probabilities by three human
reliability analysis methods are compared to determine the strengths and weaknesses of
the methodologies and to identify how they may be best used. A Technique for Human
Event Analysis (ATHEANA) has a unique approach because it searches and screens for
deviation scenarios in addition to the nominal failure cases that most methodologies
concentrate on. The quantification method of ATHEANA also differs from most
methods because the quantification is dependent on expert elicitation to produce data
instead of relying on a database or set of nominal values. The Standardized Plant
Analysis Risk Human Reliability Analysis (SPAR-H) method uses eight performance
shaping factors to modify nominal values in order to represent the quantification of the
specifics of a situation. The Electric Power Research Institute Human Reliability
Analysis Calculator is a software package that uses a combination of five methods to
calculate human error probabilities. Each model is explained before comparing aspects
such as the scope, treatment of time available, performance shaping factors, recovery and
documentation. Recommendations for future work include creating a database of values
based on the nuclear data and emphasizing the documentation of human reliability
analysis methods in the future to improve traceability of the process.
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1 Introduction
Human reliability plays an important role in the safety and reliability of the
operation of complex technologies. Space exploration, large processing facilities, and
nuclear power are all susceptible to mistakes committed by the human operators, and
these errors need to be identified and analyzed in order to avoid loss of life, injury, and
the engineering system itself. Mistakes can be costly in terms of both human life and
monetarily. This paper is only concerned with the safety of nuclear reactors and
specifically how the operators affect the probability of a failure event.
In order to better ensure the safety of nuclear reactors, the US Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) requires probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) for each reactor to
determine that the nuclear power plant (NPP) is safe to operate. As part of the PRA, a
human reliability analysis (HRA) is conducted to determine how the operators affect the
safety of the plant. These analyses attempt to recognized and quantify how human error
can lead to a failure of the NPP. Three models for the quantification of post-initiating
events are investigated and compared to determine the relative strengths of the models
and suggestions are made for future work in the HRA of NPP.
The HRA methods quantify human error probabilities (HEPs), and this is
challenging for many reasons including the fact that human actions are unpredictable and
influenced by many factors.1 First, the scope of the HRA is identified in terms of the
larger context of the needs of the PRA that the HRA results will be incorporated into.
This involves an evaluation of the available resources and the type of human failure
events that need to be addressed. From this information, appropriate models can be
selected to perform the HRA. Next, the HEPs need to be identified through a rigorous
search process. This involves the construction of logic structures and a screening process
to identify the important human failure events. Many methods include iterative processes
to help analysts with the screening process. Last, the HEPs are quantified to give
numerical results to be included in the PRA. The quantification is the focus of this paper
and the three models compared are A Technique for Human Event Analysis
(ATHEANA), 2 Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Human Reliability Analysis (SPAR-H),
3 and the Electric Power Research Institute Human Reliability Calculator (EPRI HRA
Calculator). Figure 1 shows an overview of the three main steps involved in an HRA:
Scope
What does the PRA need from the HRA? (fit into larger context)
What are the avalable resources? (expertise, money, time)
What kind of:FEs need :to be addressed? (pre/post4nitiator, EOC, EOO)
O: utput: Select appropriate odel(s)
Search Process
Is the logic structure appropriate?
What situations orfactors detetine: the important HFEs?
Output logic structure of HFEs identified for quantificaton
Quantitative Analysis
Which PSFs are important? (inclusion of appropriate PSFs in model)
How it dependency handled?
What is the basi for:the model? (expert opiion, :TRC, THERP, PSFs)
Output: Numerical reults for inclusion in PRA
-L
Figure 1: High Level Human Reliability Analysis Block Diagram
The next three sections provide overviews of how the three quantification
methods work for ATHEANA, the EPRI HRA Calculator, and SPAR-H. Section five
compares various aspects of the models including scope and the treatment of dependency,
performance shaping factors, and time among others. Finally, the conclusions of the
comparison are presented in section six along with suggestions for future work.
2 ATHEANA - A Brief Overview and Important Terminology
ATHEANA was developed to improve the capabilities of HRA, and in particular,
the method was designed to realistically represent and quantify behavior observed in
accidents and near-miss events at NPPs. ATHEANA targets specific sets of conditions
that make up the context of a situation that can "trigger error mechanisms in plant
personnel." 4 Both intentional and unintentional errors of commission (EOCs) and errors
of omission (EOOs) are quantified by ATHEANA. For each HFE, this method attempts
to identify important contexts, called error forcing contexts (EFCs), that may lead
operators carrying out an inappropriate action. The quantification process uses expert
opinion to define the probability of failure within these contexts. While quantification is
the primary focus of this paper, the search process of ATHEANA is presented here as the
context for the consensus-based expert opinion quantification method.
ATHEANA is unique in its ability to conform to specific scenarios instead of
providing limited options that can be adjusted to fit a particular context. The method
provides more adaptability to situations than more rigid models that rely on
predetermined PSFs to differentiate between varying conditions. Coupled with the search
process, ATHEANA can provide results tailored to the specific characteristics that are
likely to drive human performance. NUREG-1624 provides guidance for post-initiating
events and analysis of post-initiator HFEs has been the focus for the model, but there is
no reason that the same process could be applied to pre-initiator HFEs. This flexibility is
an advantage of the method over many current HRA techniques.
Figure 2 provides a graphical summary of the ATHEANA process; these eight
steps will be reviewed.
0 Iterative
0 0 O 0
Figure 2: Summary Flow Chart of the ATHEANA Process 5
2.1 Steps 1-4: Identifying Human Failure Events5
The first portion of the ATHEANA framework is designed to identify the
significant modes of human failure to include in the plant's PRA. The first step requires
the HRA team (a multi-disciplinary team comprised of experts such as HRA analysts,
PRA analysts, operators, trainers, and thermo-hydraulics specialists) to carefully define
INFORMATION BASE
Hardware: plt-specific operational •• • a: "as built, as operated"
People: training history, unwritten rules, etyculture, I operatorbiases, etc.
Other: physiological factors, MM, timing and cues, etc.
Charateriti of severe ccidents plant behavior out of expected range,
not well understood, actualplant state n t ••recognized, etc.
Underlying assumptions: operators are knowledgeable and rational,
intentional "errors" c" n • with sever consequences, but there is a
rational basis behind the decision.
the scope of the HRA required to do an "adequate" job for the overall PRA. The HRA
team must decide where the boundaries are for the analysis. Quantitative screening can
be helpful in determining the necessary scope, and NUREG-1624 suggests a method for
identifying candidate HFEs.
Once the important initiators are selected, and their corresponding event trees
identified, the HRA team proceeds to prioritize the plant functions, systems, and
equipment required to respond to the accident initiators. With these critical items
identified, candidate HFEs can be more readily identified by examining the initiating
event (IE) event tree and then systematically evaluating the event tree branch points for
possible human-caused functional failures.
With the scope and issue clearly defined, the HRA team moves on to describe the
base-case scenario, or the expected evolution of the accident scenario. Part of defining
the base case includes describing and understanding the human performance context of
the scenario. The following is a list of suggested components of the base case
description, taken from the ATHEANA user's guide: 6
* A list of possible causes of the initiating event(s)
* A brief, general description of the expected sequence of events (as in
PRA event trees), starting before reactor trip
* A description of the assumed initial conditions of the plant
* A familiarization/description of the expected plant conditions for the
accident sequence
* A specification of the expected sequence timing of plant status changes
* A description of the expected trajectories, over time, ofkey parameters
indicating plant status and a specification of the status of indications
and other cues that are expected as the sequence evolves
* Any assumptions of expected plant behavior,
system/equipment/indicator responses, and operator response
* A discussion of the procedures expected to be used for the given
situation
* A description of key operator actions, and their timing, expected
during the scenario progression
Concurrently with the base case definition, the HRA team identifies and defines
the possible human failure events and the corresponding unsafe actions (UAs, where one
or more unsafe action makes up a HFE). In order to identify the HFEs, a systematic
process, building on the IE event trees from step 1, is followed by determining: 6
1. whether the function is necessary or undesired
2. the system(s) or equipment that perform the function
3. the pre-initiator status of the system(s) or equipment
4. the functional success criteria for the system(s) or equipment
5. the functional failure modes of the system(s) or equipment
6. how the operator interacts with the equipment and deciding if EOCs, EOOs, or
both are relevant.
Both the ATHEANA user's guide6 and NUREG-1642 provide tables of example UAs for
generalized equipment functional failure modes to help the HRA team through this step.
At this point the HRA team has developed a list of HFEs and associated UAs important
to the scope of the PRA.
2.2 Steps 5-7: The Error Forcing Context
These next steps focus on defining EFCs that are most likely to lead to accident
scenarios. ATHEANA attempts to define EFCs based on the following characteristics:
many severe accidents share common attributes, plant behavior may be out of the
expected range, plant behavior may not be well understood by operators, plant procedures
may not helpful/appropriate, and the actual plant state may not being recognized by
operators.5 These error forcing contexts are comprised of a combination of plant state
(hardware) and other performance shaping factors (PSFs). The goal of identifying these
EFCs is to find regimes where operators believe an inappropriate action is the correct
action, because these are the situations that cause EOCs.
Vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of an operator need to be identified
because these may result in HFEs. In order to identify the PSFs, plant-specific
background data must be considered, such as: formal procedures, crew
characteristics/dynamics, ergonomics, informal rules and biases. An example of an
informal rule is "beat the automatic system when practical," as opposed to "wait for the
automatic system before taking action." 2 The former rule might carry with it a greater
chance for an EOC to occur. Plant biases include frequency and recency biases that arise
from plant operation and simulator training (operators may have an expectation of how a
scenario will unfold).6 The goal of this search is to find scenarios that might prove
"troublesome" to operators and produce an error-forcing context. Simulator exercises
may prove helpful in this step in that they allow the HRA analyst to observe how the
operators behave and think. They can also serve to test theories of operator response.
With the base case defined, and having an idea of what the important PSFs might be, the
HRA team searches for and defines potential deviations from the base case. These are
credible scenarios that include the identified EFC, and nuclear records show that no
serious accidents have developed from base case scenarios. Section 2.4 will provide an
example of a deviation scenario and its accompanying EFC.
The analysts must take into account other complicating factors, as well as
recovery factors, as part of the context of quantification. Complicating factors can be
PSFs or physical conditions not yet considered for a particular EFC such as additional
hardware failures, configurations problems, unavailabilities, or factors typically not
considered in a PRA. Specifically, there are two groups of PSFs that can contribute to
the EFC: those triggered by the defined EFC and additional PSFs not specific to the
context. New plant conditions or PSFs need to be included in the scenario definition, and
they can also activate different or more error mechanisms, creating an iterative process
until the EFC is described completely by the PSFs and physical conditions identified.
To prevent an unrealistically conservative estimate, recovery factors are included
in the analysis. In search for potential recovery actions and evaluation of their feasibility,
there are five steps outlined in the ATHEANA user's guide: 6
1. Define possible recovery actions given a HFE/UA has occurred
2. Consider time available for diagnosis and execution of potential recovery actions
3. Identify recovery cues
a. Timing of recovery cues
b. How compelling these cues are
i. Do they strongly alert operators to a need for recovery?
ii. Is there sufficient information to identify the most applicable
recovery action?
4. Identify additional resources for aid in recovery (i.e., more staff) and associated
timing
5. Assess the strength of recovery cues and timing with respect to EFCs - is there a
"high" or "low" likelihood of successful recovery? Deviation scenarios with high
likelihood of recovery need no further analysis or quantification. In this step,
there are some suggested factors to consider when assessing feasibility of
recovery:6
a. Dependencies between the initial error and recovery actions that would
make recovery unlikely
b. Initial mindset (or diagnosis) of the situation may be hard to break
c. Distractions or attention to other activities could cause new cues to be
overlooked
d. Operators may delay recovery action because there is a negative
consequence to taking the action; this is especially relevant when plant
hardware providing an alternative recovery is "almost" repaired.
NUREG-16242 gives further guidance on assessing recovery actions by type of
failure: "thinking" (mistakes and circumventions) or "doing" (slips and lapses). For
thinking failures, this involves assessing how the operator could persist in believing their
UA is the "correct" action, using the same process and information from step 5. "Doing"
failures, as suspected, are more straightforward. First the team must decide whether the
slip/lapse is recoverable at all: was plant hardware irreparably damaged? Was it so
damaged that the time for recovery is greater than the time available? If recoverable,
then the team must determine whether the slip/lapse can induce a mistake. If so, then it
should be further analyzed, if not, then it can be dropped from further analysis. At the
end of this process, the final EFC for the HFE and UAs describes all of the foreseen
scenarios.
2.3 Step 8: Quantification5
ATHEANA calculates the conditional likelihood of an UA given the occurrence
of an EFC. This is a departure from the typical HRA methods that quantify the
probability of human error under plant conditions specified in the event and fault trees.
The quantification has three stages. The first assigns a probability to the EFC. Next, the
conditional likelihood f the UAs capable of causing a HFE are determined, and lastly, the
conditional likelihood of no recovery from each UA is calculated.
The search process for EFCs ends when the team feels assured that the EFC is
sufficiently well defined and that both the frequency of the context and the conditional
probability of the UA in that context can be estimated with an appropriate degree of
confidence. To test the adequacy of EFCs, the HRA team can do simulator tests,
compare EFCs with past operational experience and with human performance checklists. 7
The rigorous way to quantify the probability of a human failure event (P(HFE))
is:
P(HFEIS) = Y P(EFC, ,S) * P(UAj EFC, ,S) * P(RJEFC, ,UAj , S) [1]
all i,j
where S refers to the PRA accident scenario, and P(RIEFC,, UA , S) is the probability of
non-recovery given an unsafe action has occurred in an error forcing context for that
scenario. Note that non-recovery is only modeled given an unsafe action because
otherwise there is not an operator action or inaction to recover from. The probabilities
are then summed over all UA/EFC combinations.
This rigorous method, however, requires too much resolution to be a feasible
method of quantification, and so the HRA team may choose the following method: 6
P(HFEIS) = . P(EFC, S) * P(UA, EFC,,S) [2]
all ij
In this case, recovery is factored implicitly into P(UA, EFC,, S), as explained below. For
this formulation, the HRA team must use an expert opinion elicitation approach to
quantification. 8
An error forcing context is comprised of two parts: plant state (hardware) and
performance shaping factors. For quantification purposes, P(EFC,IS) is taken directly
from the PRA, and represents the plant state portion of the EFC. P(PSFJS) is not
included explicitly in the formulation because these are based on the scenario context, so
these PSFs are implicitly taken into account in quantifying P(UAjIEFC,,S) through
expert opinion elicitation. 8
The term "error forcing context" can be misleading because it implies that the
conditional probability P(UAJEFC, S) should be near unity. This, however, is not the
case. EFCs are contexts which increase the likelihood of error, and in some cases
"trigger" error, but do not generallyforce an error.
The probability of an UA for a specific EFC is taken from the consensus expert
opinion elicitation process described below. Due to the way the expert opinion elicitation
process is structured, aleatory uncertainty, recovery, and dependencies are all holistically
incorporated into P(UAjIEFC,,S). This judgment-based quantification consists of six
steps: 8
1. Discuss HFE and influences, identify specific EFC and "aleatory" PSFs
2. "Calibrate" experts
3. Elicit an estimated curve
4. Each expert presents his estimated curve to the group of experts
5. Open discussion amongst experts
6. Arrive at consensus curve
1. So that the experts understand exactly what they are quantifying, they should
discuss and fully understand the scenario, including: the definition of the HFE in
question, the plant state (part of the EFC), and the relevant PSFs (the other part of the
EFC). To prevent the experts from being overwhelmed, only the most relevant PSFs to
the scenario at hand should be taken into account. The importance of scenario specificity
cannot be over emphasized. Most methods that incorporate PSFs do so by generically
applying an adjustment factor (i.e., increase the failure probability by a factor of 2 if there
is time pressure). ATHEANA recognizes that in some situations these factors may not
have a large impact; for example, time pressure may not impact operators in a very
familiar situation on which they get trained frequently.
This is how ATHEANA incorporates recovery actions and the PSF portion of the
EFC. Aspects such as scenario timing and relevant cues are woven into the description of
the HFE and become the context within which the experts judge the probability of a UA.
2. The next step is to calibrate the experts so they have a more intuitive
understanding of what a probability really is (i.e., 1 failure in 10 trials is 0.1). Here, they
are encouraged to think about failures as a number of x failures in n trials instead of
directly estimating a probability.
3. Now, each expert should come up with a 7-point estimation of P(UAjJEFC,,S),
including the 1st, 10h, 25t , 50th (median), 75 h, 90 h, and 990h percentiles. The experts
should start by setting the 1st and 99 h percentiles to be the probabilities for the best and
worst case scenarios, respectively. This is where the "aleatory" PSFs come in - the best
scenario is when there are no adverse PSFs, and the worst is when all the PSFs are in
play. In exercising his/her judgment, an expert would then think about an effective crew
and imagine them in the best circumstances for the 1st percentile and imagine a
particularly ineffective crew with communication difficulties and imagine them in the
worst circumstance for the 99 h percentile estimate.
There have been extensive studies demonstrating that expert opinion is replete
with potential biases, and that experts have difficulty consistently assessing the extremes
of a range. Reference 8 describes some of these biases, and suggests methods to alleviate
these effects.
4-6. After the experts have their curves, they present them to the group and the group
deliberates until a consensus is reached. Part of the reason behind a consensus-based
approach is to avoid unintentional bias. The epistemic uncertainty for this method would
be a family of curves, one for each expert's opinion - see Table 1.
Table 1: Example Expert Opinion Elicitation Results for Failure to Isolate
Open Atmospheric Dump Valve within 30 M t9
Stuck-
2.4 Example of the Search Process
Expert Percentiles
1st 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 99th
#1 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.4 0.8 1.0
#2 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.02 0.07 0.1 0.8
#3 0.001 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.4 0.6 0.9
#4 0.005 0.01 0.02 0.033 0.1 0.6 0.8
Consensus 0.004 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.2 0.5 0.9
The search process is presented as a series of steps that the HRA team took for
this limited trial of ATHEANA. 2 Each step was accompanied by a set of guiding
questions to aid the team in identifying important scenarios. For brevity, these questions
are not presented here - most of them can be found in the Sections above, and the rest
can be found in NUREG-1624. The HRA initially chose three initiating events to
quantify analyze: MLOCA, LOSP and ATWS. Only the MLOCA IE will be examined
here. Figure 3 is the simplified event tree for the MLOCA, and Table 2 is a list of top
events and their descriptions.
1. First the HRA team selected the initiating event of interest (MLOCA) and
prioritized the functional requirements as represented by the nodes of the event tree.
These functions/priorities were:
- Makeup: Medium Priority
- Heat Removal: Medium Priority
- Long-Term Heat Removal: High Priority
2. The team then examined the safety functions required, defined their success
criteria, and identified their failure modes. For each failure mode, the team asked "how
can the operators produce the effects characterized by the failure modes identified?"
From this process, they found two unsafe actions of particular significance, as described
in NUREG-1624:
- Operators stop pump (function: makeup; system: high-pressure injection)
- Operators operate pump outside design parameters (function: long-term cooling;
system: residual heat removal (RHR) system)
3. Addressing these unsafe acts, the team searched for and defined important error
forcing contexts. Here the team identified a credible accident sequence for each EFC to
simulate in order to test the strength of the EFC. Both sequences involve a MLOCA
where system repressurization is not possible, and continuous high-head injection is
required to keep the core cool and covered. Furthermore, in these sequences it is unclear
whether the steam generators act as a heat source or provide a heat sink because the break
is the primary method of heat removal, and the primary system pressure is less than the
pressure of the secondary system.2'5
HFE #1 - Inappropriate Termination of Makeup
The error forcing context of this scenario is a deceptive failure of the RCS
pressure indicators. In this simulation, one RCS pressure indicator was under repair and
the second failed stuck during operation at 550 psig. This was intended to make the
operators believe that the indicator is functioning normally, when in fact it indicated
greater sub-cooling than reality. This misinformation would prompt the operators to shut
off the pumps early (as directed by the procedure). In this case, core damage would
ensue if recovery of injection was not restored in a timely manner.
HFE #2 - Inappropriate Depletion of Resources
In this scenario, there is increased RWST depletion due to containment spray
system activation during the LOCA. If the RWST "empty" alarm sounds, high-head
pumps should be stopped until reconfiguration is complete, or pump cavitation will occur
leading to core damage unless the pressure can be reduced and low-pressure injection is
initiated. To "trigger" the operator error of 'failing to stop the high-head pump,' the
RWST alarm was made inoperable due to IRTU maintenance.
The conclusion of this limited test search was the identification of at least one
strong EFC. The failed RCS pressure indicators indeed caused the simulation crew to
prematurely stop the pumps even though the potential of a failed indicator was
recognized (but not verbalized) by one operator. However, the inoperable RWST
"empty" alarm did not prove to be a significant EFC at all - the crew paid sufficient
attention to the RWST level throughout the simulation, and the Work Control Supervisor
recognized that the IRTU maintenance could fail the alarm. It was also brought to the
attention of the trainers that in unfamiliar or tricky situations, operators might not adhere
to the strong tendencies developed through training like the "think it, say it" rule. Neither
scenario was considered significant enough to retain in the demonstration plant's HRA.
Table 2: MLOCA Event Tree Top-Event Summary9
Top Title Description
Event ID
RW RWST RWST failure - no inventory for RCS
makeup.
ALT Alternate Alternate cooling to the charging
Cooling pumps.
CSA Charging Pump Centrifugal Charging Pump Train A
failure.
CSB Charging Pump Centrifugal Charging Pump Train B
failure.
SIA SI Pump Safety injection Pump Train A
failure.
SIB SI Pump Safety Injection Pump Train B
failure.
EF EFW EFW failure - motor and turbine-
driven pumps.
OD Operator - Operator failure to depressurize
Depressurizes RCS for RHR injection, given failure
RCS of HPI.
RA RWST Valve RWST isolation valve Train A failure
to remain open - RHR and CBS
Train A suction path.
RB RWST Valve RWST isolation valve Train B failure
to remain open - RHR. and CBS
Train B suction palh.
L1 RHR Miniflow RHR Train A falure in miniflow
recirculation.
L2 RHR Minifow RHR Train B failure in minillow
recirculation.
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Figure 3: Simplified MLOCA Event Tree"
3 EPRI HRA Calculator - A Brief Overview and Important Terminology
EPRI produced the HRA Calculator to provide a tool that would produce
documented and reproducible results that is less resource intensive than competing HRA
methodologies. The HRA Calculator is a piece of software instead of being a
methodology for completing the search process and/or quantification process for the
HRA portion of a PRA. The EPRI HRA Calculator combines the SHARP1 framework
with five quantification methods (HCR/ORE, CBDT, THERP execution analysis,
THERP annunciator response and SPAR-H) to create an HRA tool that is easy to use,
consistent, transparent, and non-resource intensive." Unlike ATHEANA, the EPRI
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Calculator does not attempt to break down human failure events into specific unsafe
actions, or even into specific contexts. Rather, it takes a more generic approach, using
time reliability correlations (TRCs) and generic decision trees. This method is
specifically designed to be usable by a PRA expert with some HRA training and
instruction on use of the EPRI Calculator in the case that an HRA expert is not available.
Figure 4, below, provides a graphical summary of the EPRI HRA Calculator; these six
steps will be reviewed briefly here. 5
---------------------------
Quantification
SHARP1
-------------
----------- 
-- (
Figure 4: EPRI HRA Calculator Summary Flow Charts
3.1 Basic Terminology: HI Types, Cue-Response Structures, and Timing
To aid in the definition of human interactions (HIs), SHARP1 defines three broad
types of human interactions: 10
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Type A - Pre-Initiating event related HI
These HIs are associated with normal operation. Activities associated
with maintenance, tests, calibrations, and evolutions of the plant are all Type A
HIs. Before the initiating event, an HI can affect the availability of systems.
Type B - Initiating event related HI
In this case, a worker initiates an event by misaligning a system or through
malfunction of equipment that trips or inserts false control signals. These HIs are
not represented in the HRA because they are implicitly included in the PRA as
part of the frequency of generic initiating events. The frequencies can be
generated using plant operating histories.
Type C - Post-initiating event HI
These interactions are performed by plant staff after an initiating event,
and the two kinds of Type C HIs are CP and CR, which are procedural actuation
of systems and recovery actions, respectively. The former includes actions
directed by procedures that will terminate the accident, and the latter includes
recovery actions.
Only the post-initiating event HI quantification will be compared in this work.
Type CR HIs are highly scenario specific and are not incorporated in the plant logic
model. Instead, CR events are modeled as correction factors for individual scenarios.
The following steps, then, are primarily concerned with type CP human interactions.
In 1989, EPRI carried out a set of simulator experiments, the Operator Reliability
Experiments (ORE), in order to gather data to aide in HFE quantification-. This
program was meant to validate and support the HCR TRCs which rested upon the
cognitive categorizations of skill, rule, and knowledge based behavior.12 The
experiments, however, did not support this grouping, and cue-response structures became
the focus for quantification. The procedure driven HIs can be modeled using cue-
response structures based on five distinct scenarios. These cue-response structures for
Type CP actions, taken from EPRI TR-100259 are presented here:13
CP1: Response following a change in the plant damage state that is indicated by
an alarm or value monitored parameter (e.g., response to a spurious
pressurizer spray operation in a PWR).
CP2: Response following an event that gives rise to a primary cue (as in CP1)
that has to be achieved when a parameter is exceeded or can be seen not to
be maintainable below a certain value (e.g., initiate RHR when the
suppression pool (SP) temperature exceeds 950 F in a BWR). These HIs
involved a waiting period after the primary cue in order to reach a
determined plant state.
CP3: Response following an event that gives rise to a primary cue (as in CP1)
that has to achieved before some plant parameter reaches a critical value
(e.g., initiating SLCS before SP temperature reaches 1 100 F in a BWR).
This critical value can be regarded as a soft prompt, or secondary cue.
CP4: Performing a step in a procedure that is being followed as a result of a
plant disturbance (e.g., inhibiting ADS before lowering level in a BWR, in
response to an ATWS). The cue in this case is generally associated with
completing the previous step.
CP5: Maintaining a variable parameter below, at, or within specific limits (e.g.,
controlling the level in a steam generator to prevent overfill or dryout).
This is a control action.
Only CP1 - CP3 HIs can be quantified using the HCR/ORE process. The timing
information for those cue-response structures are described by the following: T1/2 is the
median crew response time to initiate the appropriate action, Tm is the time required to
execute the appropriate action (the "manipulation" time), Tw is the time available to
diagnose and initiate the appropriate action, and Tsw is the total time window between an
initial cue (the time origin) and irreversible plant damage.
3.2 Steps 1-3: SHARP1 and Event Definition
SHARP1 is the result of improvements made on the SHARP model as
recommended by the EPRI sponsored Benchmark of SHARP report.14 The Nuclear
Utility Services Corporation reviewed SHARP and created an accident scenario and
benchmark process. The experts found that SHARP should emphasize the integration of
the HRA into the overall PRA methodology. Instead of breaking the steps of the SHARP
method apart as being completed by human reliability or systems analysts, another
suggestion was to form an integrated team to follow the entire process through. The
evolution to SHARP1 included a new approach, emphasizing the integration of the HRA
with modeling the plant. The new method also includes only four steps, now called
stages that are iterative instead of sequential as the original seven step SHARP.
The first step is the identification of significant plant states. In order to do this,
the HRA team must limit the scope and context of the analysis. This includes defining
initiating event groups and documenting possible plant responses to each group,
including success criteria definitions for each function in the event tree and identification
of proper EOPs After the scope and context of the analysis is set, the team can proceed
to qualitatively screen the interactions.15, 5 This is done by identifying significant plant
states and functions that are crucial to accident mitigation. Because the EPRI HRA
Calculator is software, the process is well defined by the inputs to the software. For
example, the software will ask for specific information, and follow up with the next
appropriate step.
Understanding the Emergency Operating Procedures is crucial when trying to
understand the procedure based post-initiating events. This includes identifying failures
in following the EOPs that can lead to unique and significant evolutions of the initial
scenario. This step in the event definition stage is where the team can dive into the
details of specific scenarios. While there is no specific guidance on how this breakdown
and impact assessment should be done, SHARP1 refers to a variant of NUREG/CR-3177
as a possible procedure. This variant involves identifying critical values of key plant
parameters associated with EOP response points and evaluating HIs via these parameters.
However the team decides to carry out this step, they should be thorough and include
such components as: 13
- examining why the HI is required
- understanding how the HI is carried out
- identifying scenario-specific performance shaping factors
- identifying and understanding dependencies
- understanding failure consequences on the plant
- understanding failure consequences on subsequent operator actions
- identifying possible effects of training on operator actions (similar to what
ATHEANA calls identifying "unwritten rules")
- defining time sequence of the accident progression
- defining the cue-response structure of the HI
The plant logic models need to be updated to incorporate the failure modes and
dependencies. Failure modes should be modeled in only as much detail as necessary to
capture the proper dependencies because too much detail at this level will make
quantification significantly more difficult. Once this step is complete, the team should
double check that the overall plant model is self-consistent, all assumptions are
documented and well understood, and HI basic events are clearly defined and ready for
quantification. 5
3.3 Steps 4-6: Quantification
The EPRI quantification method is based on dividing the human failure event into
a failure to initiate the proper action (pc) and failure to execute (pE). The probability pE is
quantified using THERP, where look-up tables for simple manipulation actions based on
non-nuclear data, along with PSF correction factors, are used to find the probability of
failure. The probability pc, however, is more difficult to estimate. The first choice for
estimating Pc is to simply look it up using a TRC - a curve, as in Figure 6, that correlates
non-response probability to available time (Tw, T').13 ,'5 This time-reliability approach is
called the HCR/ORE method, and is further described in Section 3.2.1. Figure 5 is a
simple event tree that shows how the two probabilities are related to success.
Failure to Failure to
Initiate Execute
Correct Correct
Response Response Success
PE
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Figure 5: Generalized Event Tree for Calculating HEPs 13
For a short available time (Tw), this method works quite well. However, the data
used to create these curves fails to include those points where the operators misdiagnosed
the situation and were on the "wrong path." For these cases, the extrapolated curve, seen
as the dotted line, is not an accurate assessment of the HEP. For long times (Tw,), the
actual probably of non-response would behave asymptotically, with a minimum that
reflects a failure of the operator to properly diagnose the correct action, as seen in the
figure below. Therefore, the HCR/ORE method is only useful for some situations. Other
situations require an alternate method; that alternate approach is generally the cause-
based decision tree (CBDT) method described in Section 3.2.2.
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Figure 6: Conceptual Representation of the Pc Distribution as a Function of Available
Time (Tw, Tw,). 13
3.2.1 HCR/ORE
In addition to validating the cue-response structures, the ORE data also
demonstrated that the lognormal distribution was a good approximation for HEP
quantification, and so the HCR/ORE correlation was developed: 13
Pc =Pr(tr > T)=- D ln(Tw1/2 [3]
where T1/2 is the median response time, a is the logarithmic standard deviation of
normalized time, tr is the response time, Tw is the available time, and (Do is the standard
normal cumulative distribution. This correlation is demonstrated in Figure 7 below: 13
n kTII2))r
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Figure 7: HCR/ORE Correlation, Lognormal Distribution of Response Time
The HRA team can apply these curves to simply estimate Pc. First they determine
which cue-response structure is appropriate and find the T1/2 and a for that curve. Then,
for a given scenario, they determine the time window of the total system (Tsw,) of a given
HI from thermo-hydraulic codes (like MAAP). This system window must be adjusted
(Tsw) to fit the HI event description (i.e., MAPP may give the total time until an event,
but if the HI event begins with an alarm or parameter value, the time origin must also
begin at the point that the alarm is sounded or the parameter value is reached). To use the
curve the team must calculate the normalized time window: 13
Twnormalized = (Tsw - Tm)/Tl/2 = Tw/Ti/2 [4]
again, Tm is the time needed to actually execute the necessary action, or the
"manipulation time." Using the appropriate cue-response curve, the team can then just
look up pc on the graph for a given normalized time window (see a), or calculate it using
Equation 3.
This method is only valid in the ranges where operating and simulator data is
available - extrapolation of these curves may produce unrealistically low estimates, and
CBDTs should be used instead for these cases. 5 It is generally good practice to perform a
CBDT analysis in addition to using HCR/ORE and use the highest (reasonable) HEP to
be conservative. Furthermore, the probabilities taken from the HCR/ORE correlation are
only as good as the inputs to the correlation: Ti2 and a. Sigma is generally taken from
the ORE curves for a given cue-response structure. T/2 should be obtained from plant-
specific, HI specific data, such as simulator experiments or operator/trainer judgment.
For the latter case, it is recognized that operations personnel may not have a good grasp
for the time required for more complicated actions. The time ranges can, in these cases,
be indirectly estimated by having the personnel identify ranges of key parameters within
which they operators might act - the times could then be obtained from the thermo-
hydraulics code. The median time would then be the middle of the given range.
3.2.2 Cause-Based Decision Tree (CBDT) 13,5
The CBDT method is used to find HEPs for situations where TRCs are not
applicable, situations such as: CP-4 and CP-5 HIs, HIs where Tw>>TIn (ample diagnostic
time) and other areas where the HCR/ORE method is determined to be unrealistically
low. This method is based on a decision tree decomposition of a HFE into situation
specific failure mechanisms, associated PSFs and possible recovery modes. Each HI
interaction is decomposed into two high-level failure modes, each of which are in turn
broken down into four failure mechanisms. These modes and mechanisms are defined in
EPRI TR-100259:
Mode 1: Failures of the Plant Information-Operator Interface
a) The required data are physically not available to the control room operators.
b) The data are available, but are not attended to.
c) The data are available, but are misread or miscommunicated.
d) The available information is misleading.
Mode 2: Failure in the Procedure-Crew Interface
e) The relevant step in the procedure is skipped.
f) An error is made in interpreting the instructions.
g) An error is made in interpreting the diagnostic logic.
h) The crew decides to deliberately violate the procedure.
A decision tree is created for each failure mechanism (see Figure 8 a-h). The
nodes for each tree are PSFs which were predetermined to be important. The definitions
for each PSF and any addition guidance provided to analysts on how to assess each PSF
is provided in EPRI TR-100259:
a) Availability of Information:
1. Indicator Available in CR - Is the indicator in the Control Room?
2. CR Indicator Accurate - Are the indications available accurate?
3. Warn/Alt. Procedure - If the displayed information is perceived to be
unreliable, do the procedures direct the operator to alternate sources of
information? Do they warn the operator the indication might be inaccurate?
4. Training on Indicator - Has the crew received training in interpreting or
obtaining the required information under conditions similar to those prevailing
in this scenario?
b) Failure of Attention:
1. Low v. High Workload - Do to the cues critical to the HI occur at a time of
high workload or distraction? [Workload or distraction leading to a lapse of
attention (omission of an intended check) is the basic failure mechanism for
this mechanism.]
2. Check v. Monitor - Is the operator required to perform a one-time check of a
parameter, or is he required to monitor it until some specified value?
"Monitor" leads to a greater failure probability than "check" because the
operator might miss (exceed) the specified value if he does not check the
parameter frequently enough.
3. Front v. Back Panel - Is the indicator displayed on the front or back panel of
the main control area? Does the operator have to leave the control area to
read the indicator?
4. Alarmed v. Not Alarmed - Is the critical value of the cue signaled by an
annunciator? If the alarm comes in long before the value of interest is reached,
it will likely be silenced and therefore ineffective.
c) Misread/Miscommunicated Data:
1. Indicator Easy to Locate - Is layout, demarcation, and labeling of the control
boards such that it is easy to locate the required indicator?
2. Good/Bad Indicator - Is the MMI good or bad? Is it conducive to errors in
reading the display?
3. Formal Comms. - Is a formal or semi-formal communication protocol (i.e., 3-
way communication) used for transmitting values? Is the value always
identified with its associated parameter?
d) Information Misleading:
1. All Cues as Stated - Are cues/parameter values as stated in the procedure? For
example, if high steamline radiation is given as one of the criteria for a
decision or action, at the time for the given action, the steamline radiation
indicator would read high, not normal. The "no" branch is used if an indicator
is not obviously failed but would not give the anticipated value (i.e., if the
steamline was isolated).
2. Warning of Differences - Does the procedure itself provide a warning that a
cue may not be as expected, or provide instructions on how to proceed if the
cue states are not as anticipated?
3. Specific Training - Have operators received specific training in which the cue
configuration was the same as the situation of interest where the correct
interpretation of the procedure for the degraded cue state was emphasized?
4. General Training - Have the operators received general training that should
allow them to recognize that the cue information is not correct in the
circumstances? That is, is it something that every licensed operator is
expected to know? For the steamline example, the answer would be "yes"
because isolations are common; for instrument abnormalities that only occur
under a very special set of circumstances, the answer would be "no" unless the
operators had received specific training. Operators cannot be expected to
reason from their general knowledge of instrumentation to the behavior of a
specific indicator in a situation where they are not forewarned and there are
other demands for their time and attention.
e) Skip a Step in the Procedure :
1. Obvious v. Hidden - Is the relevant instruction a separate, stand-alone
numbered step or is it easily overlooked? A "hidden" instruction might be on
of several steps in a paragraph, in a note or caution, on the back of page, etc.
2. Single v. Multiple - At the time of the HI, is the procedure reader using more
than one flowchart procedure?
3. Graphically Distinct - Does the step stand out on the page? This effect is
diluted if there are several things on the page which stand out.
4. Placekeeping Aid - Are placekeeping aids, such as checking off completed
steps, used by all crews?
f) Misinterpret Instruction :
1. Standard Wording - Does the step use unfamiliar or ambiguous nomenclature
or grammatical structure? Does it require any explanation?
2. All Required Information - Does the step present all information required to
identify the actions directed and their objectives?
3. Training on Step - Has the crew received training on the correct interpretation
of this step under conditions similar to those in the given HI?
g) Misinterpret the Decision Logic :
1. "NOT" Statement - does the step contain the word "not"?
2. AND or OR Statement - Does the procedure step present diagnostic logic in
which more than one condition is combined to determine the outcome?
3. Both AND & OR - Does the step contain a complex logic involving a
combination of ANDed and ORed terms?
4. Practiced Scenarios - Has the crew practiced executing this step in a scenario
similar to this one in a simulator?
h) Deliberate Violation (*NOTE: this tree is rarely used in practice)
1. Belief in Adequacy of Instruction - Does the crew believe that the instructions
presented are appropriate to the situation (even in spite of any potential
adverse consequences)? Do they have confidence in the effectiveness of the
procedure for dealing with the current situation? In practice this may come
down to: have they tried it in the simulator and found that it worked?
2. Adverse Consequences if Comply - Will literal compliance produce
undesirable effects, such as release of radioactivity, damage to the plant,
unavailability of needed systems or violation of standing orders? In the
current regulatory climate, a crew must have strong motivation for
deliberately violating a procedure.
3. Reasonable Alternatives - Are there any fairly obvious alternatives, such as
partial compliance or use of different systems, that appear to accomplish some
or all of the goals of the step without the adverse consequences?
4. Policy of "Verbatim " Compliance - Does the utility have and enforce a strict
policy of verbatim compliance with EOPs and other procedures?
a) Data not Available:
Indicator Indicator
Avail. in CR Accurate
Warn/Alt. Training on
in Procedure Indicator
(a) Negligible
(b) Negligible
(c) Negligible
(d)
(e)
.0015
.05
(f) .5
(g) n/a
b) Failure of Attention:
Check Once Front v. Alarmed v.
v. Monitor Back Panel Not Alarmed
PCb
(a) Negligible
(b) .00015
(c) .003
(d) .00015
(e) .003
(f) .0003
(g) .006
(h) Negligible
(i) Negligible
(j) .00075
(k) .015
(1) .00075
(m) .015
(n) .0015
(o) .03
Pea
Low v. Hi
Workload
1st
2 nd
--Ci_
c) Misread/Miscommunicated Data:
Indicator Good/Bad Formal
Easy to Find Indicator Comm.
Pcc
(a) Negligible
(b) .003
(c) .001
(d) .004
(e) .003
(f) .007
Warning of Specific
Differences Training
General
Training
PCd
(a) Negligible
(b) .003
(c) .01
(d) .1
(e) 1.0
e) Skip a Step in the Procedure:
Obvious v.
Hidden
Graphically
Distinct
Placekeep.
Aid
d) Information Misleading:
All Cues
Stated
Single v.
Multiple
PCe
(a) .001
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
.003
.003
.01
.002
.004
.006
.013
.1
I
I
I
|
I
li-
f) Misinterpret Instruction:
Standard
Wording
All Required Training on
Information Step Pcf
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
g) Misinterpret Decision Logic:
"NOT" AND or OR Both AND Practiced
Statement Statement & OR Scenario
Negligible
.003
.03
.003
.003
.006
.06
Pcg
e) Deliberate Violation:
Belief in Adverse "Verbatim"
Adequate Consequences Reasonable Compliance
Tnstruction if Comnlv I Alternative Policv
(a) .016
(b) .049
(c) .006
(d) .019
(e) .002
(f) .006
(g) .01
(h) .031
(i) .0003
(j) .001
(k) Negligible
(g) Negligible
PCe
(a) Negligible
(b) Large
(c) Very Large
(d) Negligible
(e) Negligible
Figure 8: CBDT Failure Mode Decision Trees, a-h13
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3.2.3 Calculating the HEP
To calculate the HEP, all of the applicable failure mechanisms need to be
included, and for each failure mechanism, the analyst chooses the branch that most
closely describes the HI being quantified. This calculation breaks the options into
discrete probabilities using the failure mode decision trees, which helps eliminate some
of the possible inconsistency between analysts. There is no way to eliminate the use of
judgment when calculating human error, but the software attempts to provides a rigid
structure for the calculations. The total HEP is then calculated according to the following
equation: 13
Pc = i=1,-2 Yj PP, [5]
where pj is the probability of mechanism j of mode i occurring, and pl,' is the associated
non-recovery probability for that mechanism.
The probabilities pij come from generic decision trees for a given mechanism.
These default probabilities are generally taken from THERP, but can be adjusted by the
HRA team. Some of the THERP values have been altered because of feedback from the
ORE and other reviews of THERP.' 3 The probability pij is then taken from the branch
which represents the expected plant conditions. Similarly, recovery factors can also be
taken from THERP or estimated by the HRA team, and are influenced primarily by
opportunity for review by another operator and time available (Table 3 and Table 4). To
avoid over-crediting recovery, credit is only given for one recovery mechanism; however,
override values may be used if credit for multiple recoveries can be justified.5
Table 3: Available Recovery Factors for a Given Recovery Time5
Table 4: Example Recovery Checklist with Probability for Recovery (modified) 13,5
HI Failure Mode Review Type Available
Tree Branch Self- Extra STA Shift El
Review Crew Review Change Re
a a No 0.5 No 0.5 0.5
Credit Credit
b d X No X X X
No
Credit
Credit
No
Credit
Recovery Time Effective
Factor
Other (Extra) At any time that there are crew members over
Crew and above the minimum complement present in
the CR and not assigned to other tasks
STA 10 to 15 minutes after reactor trip.
ERFITSC 1 hour after reactor trip - if constituted
Shift Change 6 hours after reactor trip given 8 hour shifts
9 hours after reactor trip given 12 hour shifts
WF
view
d c No 0.5 X X 0.1
Credit
e a X 0.5 No X X
Credit
f i No 0.5 X X X
Credit
g b No 0.5 X X X
Credit
h c No X X No No
Credit Credit Credit
4 SPAR-H- A Brief Overview and Important Terminology
The Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Human Reliability Analysis (SPAR-H)
provides a simplified method for estimating HEPs at US nuclear power plants (NPPs).3
SPAR-H provides steps for generating both pre-initiator and post-initiator HEPs, and this
paper is only concerned with post-initiator HEPs for comparison with the other models.
The origin of this methodology is the Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP)
program established by the NRC in 1979 as a response to the Risk Assessment Review
Group report in 1978. The original PRA models developed as part of ASP needed further
refinement, and the ASP HRA method was updated in 1994 by the Idaho National
Laboratory. In 1999, a second revision was made and this became known as the SPAR-H
method, which also included LP/SD scenarios as a separate class of events. 3
SPAR-H is strictly a quantification method and does not include a unique
approach to search and/or screen HFEs. NUREG/CR-6883 does refer to ATHEANA and
SHARP1, and includes a section comparing the results from the SPAR-H quantification
process with THERP, ASEP, HEART, CREAM, and SHARP1. This section will focus
on providing an understanding of the basis for SPAR-H and how it handles varying
situations.
The essential parts of the framework can be summarized as follows: 3
* Probabilities separated into contributions from diagnosis failure and action
failure
* Accounts for the context associated with HFEs by using PSFs and
dependency assignment to adjust base-case HEPs
* Pre-defined base-case HEPs and PSFs with guidance to improve
consistency and simplify the quantification process
* Uncertainty analysis uses a beta distribution
* Provides worksheets to further facilitate consistency and reproducibility
4.1 Model of Human Performance
The cognitive model used by the SPAR-H method is based on the information
processing and stimulus-response models. The former models behavior as a combination
of perceptual elements, memory, and decision making, while the latter largely ignores
any thought processes and treats human behavior as reflexive to a situation based on
associations between actions and either rewards or punishments. These two types
psychology are used separately in the SPAR-H model: information processing is used for
the diagnosis and the stimulus-response is used for the action of the operator.
Operational factors that need to be accounted for by the human performance model are
accounted for in SPAR-H by the eight performance shaping factors. These operational
factors come in four main groups: inflow and perception; working memory/short-term
memory; processing and long-term memory; and response.3
Inflow of information can be visual, auditory, or kinesthetic. The information
flows through filters, which change how the information is perceived and interpreted.
For example, noise and auditory distractions in an environment can mask the strength of
a message such as an annunciator. In the context of SPAR-H, perception is detection,
and the perception of an operator is effected by experience, learning, and beliefs. These
are included by the assignment of the PSFs.
Working and short-term memory form the second operational factor covered by
SPAR-H and processing and long-term memory are the third. The working memory is
treated as the ability of the operator to keep information in an active mental state, which
is differentiated from long-term memory that needs to be activated and retrieved. The
capacity of short-term memory is not set, but it varies with the way information can be
grouped. To aid the memory, SPAR-H models procedures and similar elements as
external memory that aid with both short and long term memory. This factor is modeled
as the procedures and job aid PSF. Other PSFs account for variable environments and
mental demands affecting the memory.4
The fourth operational factor is the response of the personnel, and similarly,
SPAR-H accounts for varying scenarios with PSFs. All except two of the PSFs that will
be explained in detail in a later section affect the response of the operator. Generally,
SPAR-H provides guiding analysis as opposed to a mathematical model of human
information processing. The information processing model reflects psychological
principles that can be linked to human performance. Table 4.13 describes which PSFs are
associated with each of the four operational factors.
Table 5: Operational Factors in SPAR-H. Including how eG•y are Incorporated
(The numbers aftfe each entry refer to the PSF list at the bottom of the table.)
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4.2 Task and Error Types
Diagnosis and action are two kinds of tasks completed by personnel as specified
by SPAR-H. Diagnosis actions require thinking to observe and interpret the information
to find the cause and choose a course of action. These actions rely on knowledge and
experience to plan an appropriate course of action. Action tasks are activities dictated by
rules, procedures, or diagnosis. Each task is assigned a probability, and the probabilities
of a diagnosis task and its action task are summed to yield the joint HEP. Dependence
between the two tasks is calculated to prevent underestimating an HEP.
SPAR-H does not differentiate between errors of commission and errors of
omission, because the documentation states that experience shows that no more accurate
prediction of error can be made by distinguishing between the two. Instead, base failure
rates use a composite rate for omissions and commissions. It is suggested that HRA
analysis follow a systematic search process to identify errors likely to result in unsafe
acts. 3
4.3 Treatment of Dependency
SPAR-H treats dependency similarly to THERP.18 There are five levels of
dependence ranging from no dependence to complete dependence. Guidance is provided
for determining the level of dependence based on the time separation of actions, location
of actions, additional clues, and if the same crew is involved. There is no explicit
treatment of dependency across accident sequences, but the same concepts could be
generalized to fit multiple HFEs in an accident sequence.
PSFs are treated as independent by SPAR-H; although, it is recognized that for
specific scenarios one PSF may be chosen based on how which level of another PSF was
selected. For example, when there is ample time, but also less than thirty minutes of time
beyond the nominal time, it is expected that the obvious diagnosis complexity PSF level
is chosen. To prevent PSFs from providing exaggerated results due to their independent
treatment, SPAR-H provides a method for making the HEPs less conservative. This is
accomplished by using an adjustment factor if more than three PSFs were determined to
be negative.4
4.4 Performance Shaping Factors
The definitions of the eight PSFs are discussed below, and there is some overlap
that could not be avoided between some PSFs. The PSFs are typically stratified into
levels that are assigned probabilities, and diagnosis and action events are typically
evaluated for each PSF individually. For all of the PSFs, there is an insufficient
information level that can be used as a default. 3
1. Available Time- This is the time a crew has to diagnose and respond to
abnormal events. For the diagnosis stage, the available time is broken down
into groups ranging from inadequate time with a P(fail)=1, to nominal time
and extra time. Extra and expansive time both require greater than thirty
minutes beyond the nominal time required to respond to the event. The
categories that have sufficient time, but less than thirty minutes are corrected
by having the analyst use the "obvious diagnosis" PSF for the complexity.
That eliminates needing another range for the available time. The time range
for actions is greater because actions can be much faster, such as just pressing
a button or turning a switch. The groups for the action probabilities range
from inadequate time to greater than fifty times that required. The nominal
time for actions is defined as having "some extra time" in addition to the
required time to complete the appropriate action, unlike the diagnosis stage
definition.
2. Stress/Stressors- This PSF models the negative impacts of stress. Even
though stress has been recognized as a positive motivating force in some
situations, the stress on a NPP crew modeled by SPAR-H assumes that it is
detrimental. Stressors are environmental factors such as intense noise, heat, or
increased levels of radiation that can affect performance. The three levels of
stress identified are extreme, high, and nominal. There is also an insufficient
information option in the case that a stress level cannot be assigned. Extreme
stress is caused by a sudden stressor and lasts for an extended period. For
example, the potential for radioactive release would be modeled as an extreme
stress. High stress is defined as above nominal levels, and it degrades
performance. This level can be caused by distractions and unexpected events.
The nominal level of stress is conducive to good performance.
3. Complexity- This PSF has more overlap with others and is hard to quantify
independently from other factors. The complexity is a measure of how
difficult a task is to perform in context. More demanding tasks with multiple
parts that are ambiguous are highly complex, while nominally complex tasks
are not difficult to perform due to little ambiguity and/or few variables.
Figure 4.2 shows many factors that contribute to the complexity of a situation.
Figure 9: Diagram of Factors that Contribute to the Complexity PSF in SPAR-H3
There is no procedure for determining the influence of complexity based on
the factors in Figure 4.2 that contribute. As mentioned earlier while
discussing the available time PSF, the obvious diagnosis level of complexity
is for tasks that are unlikely to be misdiagnosed. There is no need for an
obvious action complexity PSF because the nominal complexity covers simple
actions.
4. Experience/Training- The training and experience of the crew can affect their
response to a scenario. This PSF accounts for the crew being trained for the
particular scenario or similar scenarios and the years of experience. The low
PSF level is for less than six months of experience, which at a US NPP would
rarely apply to a licensed operator. The nominal level of 6 months of training
and adequate schooling would be typical of a newly licensed operator, but
most US NPP licensed operators and supervisors should qualify at the high
level for this PSF, which requires extensive knowledge in a range of
scenarios. Bypassing safety systems or operating in an abnormal
configuration may decrease the level of the crew for a given situation.
5. Procedures- Even though all NPP documents are carefully formulated to
provide the correct information, there may be situations where the information
provided by the procedure is inadequate or incorrect. The diagnosis and
action activities need to be evaluated separately, and the SPAR-H
documentation warns against using the PSF for procedures to adjust for a
complex task when the procedures are adequate. The diagnosis activity has a
nominal level if the procedure is available and enhances performance as
intended. Next is the available, but poor level, which impedes performance
because it is hard to use, but all of the necessary information remains
included. An incomplete procedure does not include the necessary
information and the lowest level for a procedure is not available. At the other
end of the spectrum, a diagnostic/symptom oriented procedure assists the crew
in diagnosis and helps keep the plant safe. Using a diagnostic oriented
procedure should make it less likely that human error will have a negative
impact on the state of the plant, but this is only true if the procedure is
appropriate for the condition of the plant and is easy for the operating crew to
follow. The action procedures have all of the same PSF levels except for the
diagnostic/symptom oriented procedures.
6. Ergonomics/Human Machine Interaction- The ergonomics of the control room
are accounted for by this PSF. The quality and quantity of information that
the instrumentation, controls, and computers communicate to the crew effects
its response to a scenario. As control rooms undergo updates, user friendly
software becomes more important to the human machine interaction (HMI) as
digital control and instrumentation becomes more prevalent. Another aspect
of HMI is the set point of an alarm relative to a dangerous level. It can be
detrimental to performance to have an alarm set point close enough to the
limit that there is not enough time for the crew to react and correct the
situation before surpassing the limit. The nominal level of this PSF is for
HMI design that supports performance. Above nominal is the good level, in
which case the HMI design improves task performance, and below are the
poor and misleading levels, which negatively impact performance. The
lowest level accounts for times when required information is not available to
the NPP personel.
7. Fitness for Duty- This PSF describes the state of the crew both physically and
mentally. Physical factors include fatigue, illness, drug use, and other medical
problems that effect performance. Mental factors include overconfidence,
personal problems, and other distractions that may similarly degrade
performance of the operator. The levels for the fitness for duty PSF are unfit,
degraded fitness, and nominal. The nominal in this instance is for the case
where nothing degrades the performance of the individual. Degraded fitness
refers to distractions and minor physical problems that negatively affect the
employee's ability to perform such as headaches, fever, cold, or bad news.
The unfit level is reserved for cases where the operator is unable to fulfill his
or her duties.
8. Work Processes- This PSF measures the impact of management, organization,
and supervision on the crew. SPAR-H maintains that supervisors need to be
figures of authority, so a supervisor becoming involved in the specifics of an
event instead of leading can be considered a breakdown in the work process
and detrimental to the performance of the crew. Conflict within a crew,
indecisiveness, and uncoordinated approaches to safety also negatively affect
performance. The three levels of work process are poor, nominal, and good
based on whether the various work processes at the NPP are detrimental, not
affecting performance, or helpful. Examples of what would be poor PSF
levels are inadequate turnover information, unclear performance expectations,
and conflict among personnel. The good level can be achieved by good
communication and supportive policies enhancing the crew performance.
4.5 Uncertainty and Recovery
The SPAR-H method describes a way to calculate the uncertainty of an HEP.
Epistemic and aleatory uncertainties are handled, but they are not separated and there is
no mathematic process for separating the uncertainty into the two categories. SPAR-H
uses a beta distribution to describe the uncertainty of an HEP, and the constraints on the
distribution yield the greatest uncertainty for the HEP.4
All calculated HEPs are treated as mean values, so in order to determine the
uncertainty, a second constraint is required. The fact that an HEP can only fall into the
range between zero and one provides this constraint, and this constrained non-informative
(CNI) prior maximizes the uncertainty for the given mean value. One potential problem
with this method for calculating uncertainty is that by basing the uncertainty solely on the
HEP, analyst variability is ignored. In other words, if two analysts find two different
HEPs, then the two HEPs will have different uncertainties since the uncertainties are
based only on the mean value. The uncertainty does not represent information based on
the specifics of the accident scenario or analyst bias due to the use of the beta
distribution.
Recovery actions in SPAR-H are modeled by the analyst in event and fault trees.
This places the burden modeling the possibility of recovery on the analyst when
developing the logic structures. An alternative way for the analyst to represent the
influence of recovery on an HEP is to adjust the PSF values. Work practices, procedures,
and ergonomics can be used to positively influence the HEP if a misdiagnosis is likely to
be recovered.3
5 Comparative Analysis of ATHEANA, SPAR-H, and the EPRI HRA Calculator
The three HRA methods presented have various strengths and weakness that
make them better suited to specific applications. The models are recapped with an
overview before comparing particular aspects of the models to determine how they differ
and what the implications of the differences may be. The goal of this chapter is to
understand how the quantification methods vary when calculating post-initiating event
HEPs.
Summary:
- Differences in Objectives:
* EPRI: To quantify HEPs in a consistent, transparent and reproducible
fashion. The method also aims to be less resource intensive and can be used
by a PRA analyst without significant HRA expertise. A specialized HRA
team is not required to use the EPRI HRA Calculator.
* SPAR-H: This method was designed to provide a quantification methodology
adequate for the ASP program that supports plant-specific PRA models for the
US NRC. The method provides limited guidance for identifying or modeling
HFEs.
* ATHEANA: To find contexts where operators are likely to fail without
recovery, and quantify the associated HEP. This includes inquiring into how
operators can further degrade the plant condition while still believing their
actions are correct. The search process of this model identifies PSFs and
includes a screening process.
Contexts Considered in Quantifying HEPs:
* The three methods all incorporate aleatory and epistemic PSFs to some
degree, and will be further discussed in the next section.
* ATHEANA was not written to address pre-initiating HFEs and even though
there are no technical problems using the method, there is no guidance
provided by the ATHEANA documentation to guide quantification of pre-
initiator events. This paper is concerned with only post-initiating events for
the three models.
* ATHEANA takes a look at a broader set of PSFs and contexts than the other
two models discussed. The accident sequence includes the consequences of a
misdiagnosis beyond simple failure of the procedure.
* The EPRI Calculator is prescriptive and limits the PSFs and cognitive factors
the analyst must consider, thus enhancing consistency among analysts and
reducing the level of resources needed. However, CBDT and ATHEANA still
have the same approach to evaluating cognitive context.
* SPAR-H similarly limits the factors, this time to eight PSFs; this is only a
quantification method, so there is no search process and little guidance
provided to find HFEs, which would be necessary to perform the entire HRA
portion of a PRA
- Quantification:
* ATHEANA uses expert elicitation for quantification after the error forcing
context is described. Agreement between the experts is addressed as part of
the quantification method.
* Depending on the type of HI - short or long available time, significant
diagnosis - the EPRI Calculator defines the context based on the appropriate
method. Quantification is completed using a time reliability curve or cause
based decision trees.
* SPAR-H uses nominal HEPs that are varied by using 8 fixed PSFs to account
for the uniqueness of a situation. It deals with dependency between PSFs with
a correction that takes the specifics of the situation into account only by using
the number of PSFs included, ignoring that interactions between PSFs may
vary with the combination of PSFs involved.
5.1 Terminology
Adjustment Factor (NUREG//CR-6883): This term describes the factor that is used to
adjust PSFs for cases where more than two PSFs are determined to be negative. This
factor is designed to prevent the model from producing HEPs that are overly
conservative.
Human Failure Event (HFE): This term describes an event where a malfunction of a part
of the plant is caused by human action. An error of commission or error of omission can
be the source of an HFE. This term is widely used in ATHEANA and SPAR-H, but not
used in the EPRI HRA Calculator. Instead, the calculator uses the term human
interaction, explained below.2
Human Interaction (HI): The EPRI HRA Calculator defines human actions as any
expected or actual action by a plant operator. Similarly to HFE, this includes both errors
of commission and errors of omission. The HIs are broken down into Type A, B, and C
depending on how the HI is related to the initiator of the scenario.
Error Forcing Context (EFC) and Failure Mechanisms a-h (NUREG-1624): An error
forcing context describes the aggregate effect of the PSFs and plant conditions that make
human error more likely. These are the scenarios targeted by ATHEANA. SPAR-H does
use the term in NUREG/CR-6883, but only in reference to the ATHEANA model. The
CBDT methodology that is part of the EPRI HRA Calculator does reference EFCs, but it
does so in a more limited context. ATHEANA requires a more in-depth search process
for EFCs.
Aleatory and Epistemic Uncertainty: Aleatory uncertainty describes irregularity that
cannot be predicted. This uncertainty is due to random events that cannot be accounted
for by having better equipment or performing more rigorous calculations. There is no
way to lessen it because it is part of the system and cannot be removed. Epistemic
uncertainty, on the other hand, can be reduced because it comes from a lack of
familiarity. This type of error can be reduced by improving a method of measurement or
quantification because the uncertainty from a lack of knowledge that can be improved
through research and studies of a system.19
5.2 General Approach and Scope
This section compares the motivations and general approaches of the three
models. The focus of this paper is the quantification of post-initiating events, but the
entire scope of the model will also be addressed.
SPAR-H and the EPRI HRA Calculator were both developed to focus on the
quantification of HEPs. This is why both models lack detailed guidance for the search
and screening processes, but both models do suggest methods that can be used to identify
and screen the HEPs. The HRA Calculator suggests following the SHARP1 framework
for iteratively identifying and screening HFEs. For SPAR-H, there is not a specific
method covered in great detail, but an example using ATHEANA is provided in section
4.2.2 of NUREG/CR-6883. The EPRI HRA Calculator does reference SHARP1 in
enough detail for the model to function as an HRA tool that can stand alone and perform
an entire HRA required for a PRA.
Unlike the other models, ATHEANA was designed to find specific scenarios in
which operators are more likely to err. The methodology provides a detailed and
rigorous search process that allows for a better representation of the important factors
associated with an EFC. This is done by allowing the situation to drive development of
the PSFs. Regarding the structure of PSFs, the opposite end would have models like
SPAR-H with a fixed set of eight PSFs that can be altered to fit the context.
The resources required for the models vary with the level of detailed analysis that
the model is capable of. Given this, the most resource intense model is ATHEANA,
which requires an entire team of experts. The team consists of PRA, HRA, plant experts
(operators and staff), human factors, and thermo hydraulic experts. This is in contrast to
the expectations of the skill required to apply the EPRI HRA Calculator. Ideally, an
HRA expert would use the EPRI software, but it can be used by a PRA expert with
significant training in using the HRA Calculator.4 SPAR-H falls in the middle between
the two other models in terms of the skill requirements of the personnel. To fill out the
work sheets of the SPAR-H model, at least one experienced HRA analyst would need to
be part of the team performing the HRA.
The team of experts is also required for ATHEANA because not only is the search
and screening detailed and rigorous relative to most HRA methods, but the quantification
is based on expert opinion. As described in Chapter 2, the experts on the HRA team
estimate seven percentiles for each HEP and after deliberation to work out differences in
opinion, the average of the team is used to quantify the HEP. The EPRI HRA Calculator
is designed to quantify the HEPs while minimizing the amount of expert judgment
required. This allows the tool to be applied by non-HRA experts if an expert is not on the
staff and/or there are not resources available to hire. SPAR-H relies more on expert
judgment than the HRA Calculator. The eight PSFs need to be applied to the HFE by the
expert, but to minimize the demand on the analyst, the various levels of the PSFs are well
defined to decrease the impact of opinion on the process. The de-emphasis of expert
opinion by the EPRI Calculator and SPAR-H help the repeatability of the HEPs
quantified using the methods.
5.3 Available Time
When quantifying HEPs, time is a critical factor that is taken into account in
different ways by all three methods. It is recognized that time effects the operators by
applying pressure that can cause high stress situations, increasing the HEP. SPAR-H
takes the simplest approach to incorporating time into the HEP of the three methods.
This is done by dedicating a single PSF to available time. The levels are determined by
how much time is available compared to how much is required to perform the necessary
action. The method does recognize that the available time can affect other PSFs, but
other PSFs are only affected if the available time meets certain criteria. The EPRI HRA
Calculator incorporates available time into the HCR/ORE curves. 12 For this model, the
time available to perform an action is based on the total time window for the disturbance
minus the time to execute the correct action. ATHEANA incorporates the available time
as part of the EFC. There are many recognized situations with little available time that
operators are well trained for to ensure that they will perform the correct actions, but
ATHEANA specifically searches for EFC that are unfamiliar, and for these, the available
time is considered specifically when calculating the probability of an unsafe action given
a particular EFC. 2
In comparison, SPAR-H incorporates the simplest and least comprehensive
method of incorporating the available time into the HEP. This puts the model at a
disadvantage when compared to the HRA Calculator and ATHEANA because those
models build a scenario that incorporates time, while SPAR-H separates it as one of eight
PSFs that are essential independent. Available time is modeled in only a few discrete
levels that do not differentiate between how critical time may be for a particular scenario
in any way other than how the available time compares to the nominal time required to
complete an action or diagnosis.
5.4 Performance Shaping Factors and Response Time Variation
The quantification of SPAR-H is centered on eight PSFs, which are the only
factors that can differentiate any situation from one that has eight nominal values for the
PSFs. In order to prevent calculating HEPs greater than unity, the PSFs are corrected by
a factor if there are more than three PSFs. This method recognizes that there are
problems with multiplying scalars with probabilities.3 Beyond the eight discussed PSFs,
there is no guidance on how to include a factor that may not fall into one of the
predefined PSFs. Dependency is modeled using THERP. Both the terminology used and
modification factors taken from THERP tables are used by SPAR-H.18'4
When using HCR/ORE as part of the EPRI HRA Calculator, the analysts can
choose between the Sigma Decision Tree or the cue-response structure. PSFs are only
considered by their impact on the TRC. 13 Using CBDT with the HRA Calculator allows
incorporation of any relevant PSFs into the analysis in theory, but direction is only
provided for the PSFs included in the decision trees.
ATHEANA needs PSFs to account for variation in the response time. These PSFs
are not incorporated the same way as most HRA methods. Instead of using the PSFs to
determine the HEP, ATHEANA uses the PSFs as factors dependent on the context, so for
different conditions varying sets of PSFs are "triggered." 5 The method allows for any
PSFs to be considered that are important to the EFC; however, the experts are left to
determine how the combined PSFs for a scenario will affect the HEP quantification.
Unless there are multipliers determined a priori, there will be no other way to quantify the
PSF.2
5.5 Recovery
SPAR-H does not model recovery as a PSF or other influence that directly
changes the quantification of an HEP with a multiplicative factor. This is a weakness of
the simple eight PSF system that SPAR-H uses to quantify HEPs. The two suggested
methods that can force the HEP to reflect recovery are as follows (NUREG/CR-6883):
first, the analyst can perform more detailed analysis and update the logic structures to
incorporate recovery, and the second option is to adjust the appropriate subset of PSFs.
There is no guidance on which PSFs are appropriate for a situation.
The goal of the ATHEANA search process is to identify EFCs that are least likely
to be recovered by the operators. Recovery is used as a screening tool to eliminate EFCs
because recovery makes the scenario less important than other EFCs that are not likely to
be recovered.4 There is an option for the HRA team to perform a THERP based analysis
for recovery if it finds this desirable; however, recovery will be less likely than usual due
to expectations of short time frames that make recovery unlikely. 5
The EPRI HRA Calculator addresses recovery with the CBDT method, which
uses THERP tables. HCR/ORE does not model recovery because it assumes that the
operators will perform the correct diagnosis and action. 12 To compare, ATHEANA does
not have a fundamental need for recovery because the search process is based on finding
EFCs that operators are not likely to recover from. This provides a more thorough
analysis despite not handling the issue of recovery explicitly. The other two models
should represent recovery, but do not provide defensible methods for incorporating the
recovery into quantification of HEPs. This is because SPAR-H does not have an official
mechanism for quantifying recovery, so there are two paths for adjusting the either the
logic structure or PSFs to include recovery in the HEP.4
5.6 Documentation
Documentation is important for verifying and reproducing the results of an HRA.
None of the methods discussed provide substantial discussion of documentation, but they
do all address the issue implicitly. For ATHEANA, detailed documentation is more
important than for the other methods because the analysts have more freedom at every
stage of the HRA process from the identification and screening to the quantification of
HEPs. The reasoning behind the actions of the HRA team is not transparent or intuitively
obvious as it may be for SPAR-H. For example, using SPAR-H, the levels of PSFs are
all clearly defined, so by filling out the work sheets completely, a range of scenarios can
be inferred based on the values of the PSFs selected for the quantifications of the HEP.
This is not the case for ATHEANA, because the experts may have agreed on a particular
HEP curve for reasons that are not obvious and the reasoning behind their decision would
be lost without proper documentation.5 ATHEANA implicitly addresses the issue of
documentation by listing the results that each step needs to pass on to the next step of the
process. Assuming all of the results of each step are recorded, the HRA should be
reproducible.
The EPRI HRA Calculator essentially documents itself by saving the inputs that
the experts use to quantify the HEPs. This electronic documentation is the digital version
of the worksheets of SPAR-H. Similarly to ATHEANA the search process, SHARP1,
would be well documented if the analysts recorded how the products from each step of
SHARP1 were determined to justify the work.'"
6 Conclusion
The HRA field has made great progress in the past decade with the development
of ATHEANA, multiple revisions of the EPRI HRA Calculator, and continuing work on
second generation HRA models. After comparing the capabilities and limitations of
ATHEANA, SPAR-H, and the EPRI HRA Calculator, some conclusions and future needs
have been identified.
ATHEANA is very resource intensive when used for the entire HRA portion of a
PRA, but it can be utilized to identify and quantify specific EFCs that would benefit from
more rigorous modeling. By quantifying a select number of critical HEPs with
ATHEANA while using another quantification method for HEPs screened as less critical,
the much of the benefit of ATHEANA may be realized without expending the resources
required to use ATHEANA for the entire HRA. Providing an alternate quantification
method that does not rely so heavily on expert elicitation may reduce the resources
required to use the method and allow it to become more widely employed.
SPAR-H is not a method that can reliably incorporate all of the information from
a scenario into the eight PSFs and provide defensible results. The handling of multiple
PSFs with an adjustment factor to prevent HEPs greater than one does not take into
consideration which PSFs are acting together. Interaction between PSFs is not well
managed when there are more than two PSFs identified for a scenario. There are
suggestions in the SPAR-H documentation that guide interactions between some PSFs
that are likely to interact, such as the available time and stress/stressors PSFs; however,
the treatment of multiple PSFs does not account for the dependency of the PSFs. The
dependency ratings are based on THERP and are recognized as not "exhaustive," but do
"bring a degree of standardization." (SPAR-H REF) Inclusion of information into the
SPAR-H method provides generic HEPs without rigorous consideration of how the
specifics of the scenario can interact and affect the HEP.
Many HRA models are reliant on THERP data, which is based on old non-nuclear
data, so a new database, formed specifically for the nuclear industry, would provide more
applicable values for NPP PRAs. Such a database could be composed from the history of
nuclear power plant operation and also from simulator studies. There are some groups
working on similar tasks as this, but even after the completion of such a database, the
HRA community will need to adopt the new data for use as the underlying data that HRA
methods are based on.
Documentation within the models should be more heavily emphasized because
the validation of the calculated HEPs and selected HEPs from the search process is
dependent on understanding the process that the experts used to come to their
conclusions. There are two distinct goals of documenting HRA: to provide traceability
and reproducibility. The former refers to the ability of analysts to reference the
documentation and completely understand how the HEPs were calculated for the
situation. This includes an understanding of the situation based on the documentation
that allows the work of the analysts to be traced from the context to the quantification.
The reproducibility requires that the actual values calculated for the HEPs can be
duplicated based on the documentation. Many current HRA methods allow the analyst
the freedom to determine how detailed the documentation needs to be, so the
recommendation for documentation is that expectations and standards need to be
explicitly defined to ensure traceability.
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